Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Chapter 1 Fellow-feeling and ethical theory: the British sentimentalists
- Chapter 2 Ethical sentimentalism revisited
- Chapter 3 Shaftesbury's ethical system
- Chapter 4 Hutcheson's moral sense
- Chapter 5 What do we perceive by moral sense?
- Chapter 6 C. D. Broad's defense of moral sense theories in ethics
- Chapter 7 What is innate in moral sense?
- Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 1 - Fellow-feeling and ethical theory: the British sentimentalists
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Chapter 1 Fellow-feeling and ethical theory: the British sentimentalists
- Chapter 2 Ethical sentimentalism revisited
- Chapter 3 Shaftesbury's ethical system
- Chapter 4 Hutcheson's moral sense
- Chapter 5 What do we perceive by moral sense?
- Chapter 6 C. D. Broad's defense of moral sense theories in ethics
- Chapter 7 What is innate in moral sense?
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
If any enquire, “Whence arises this Love of Esteem, or Benevolence, to good Men, or to Mankind in general, if not from some nice Views of Self-Interest? Or, how we can be mov'd to desire the Happiness of others, without any View to our own?” It may be answer'd, “That the same Cause which determines us to pursue Happiness for our selves, determines us both to Esteem and Benevolence on their proper Occasions; even the very Frame of our Nature, or a generous Instinct, which shall be afterwards explain'd.”
Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and EvilTHE SCHOOL OF SENTIMENT
It will swiftly become evident that this book of philosophy has a central hero – Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746). Hutcheson is an admirably clear writer, but I take my starting-point from the above uncharacteristically enigmatic (or perhaps just poorly written) passage. I would rewrite it somewhat as follows: Why do we approve and admire persons whose conduct displays genuine concern for others, if that concern in no way benefits us? (And why should we even care what happens to others in the first place?) The answer is that, just as we instinctively desire our own happiness, we are innately disposed not only to care about the good of others to some degree, but also to approve of such other-regarding concern whenever we see it at work.
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- Fellow-Feeling and the Moral Life , pp. 1 - 44Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2008