INTRODUCTION

Chapter 2 offered an account of Kant's metaphysics of freedom as an idea of reason; chapter 3 focused on the concept of external freedom in relation to the categorical imperative and autonomous willing. I pointed to a difficulty that arose for Kant's initial exposition of positive freedom in connection with his subsequent distinction between internal and external freedom, namely the latter's apparent endorsement of desire-based choices as free choices. This endorsement conflicts with the distinction in the Groundwork between heteronomous willing and autonomous willing. In order to resolve this difficulty, I suggested that in the Metaphysics of Morals Kant entertains, or at least gestures towards, a conception of desiring and desire-based choices which aligns the capacity for desire closer than previously with subjects' cognitive and evaluative capacities. While this does not mean that all desire-based actions are autonomous – interests of inclination are determined heteronomously – the revised account allows for the possibility of autonomously determined, desire-based choices.