Motivation and morality

In the two preceding chapters we have advanced a general model of human motivation that incorporates a desire to act morally alongside other desires, where that desire may operate either as a direct determinant of action or as a ground for the adoption of a moral disposition. We wish, in this chapter, to push the argument forward on three distinct fronts.

Our first concern will be with the idea of economising on virtue – the idea that institutions should be designed in such a way that they do not rely on the virtue of the individuals who act under them, so that the emergence of satisfactory results arises not only through the virtue of individuals but also is supported by the force of other motives, including self-interest specifically. This idea is an old one, dating at least from St Augustine's discussion of private property as a remedium peccatorum (guard against sin) – though, as is well-known, it receives its most extensive development and application in the work of Adam Smith, David Hume, Montesquieu and the American authors of the Federalist papers.