In order that we may investigate the ability of Marxism to deal with ecological problems – the extent to which Marxist explanations and predictions are affected by the existence of such problems and the potential of the theory to explain and offer responses to them – we need to have some idea of what these ecological problems are. Without that we will be unable to identify what is required of the theory or to assess the accounts of ecological problems given by Marx and Engels. In this first chapter I will therefore consider the following two questions, which are central to the enterprise of defining ecological problems.

1. What distinguishes that subset of problems faced by society that are referred to as ecological problems?

2. What are the values or moral perspectives that lead to these phenomena being regarded as problems?

There is a difficulty involved in attempting to define a phenomenon prior to putting it in a theoretical context, since part of the function of a theory is to provide us with a set of terms with which to characterise the phenomena which the theory addresses. As Hegel put it: ‘A preliminary attempt to make matters plain would only be unphilosophical, and consist of a tissue of assumptions, assertions, and inferential pros and cons, i.e. of a dogmatism without cogency, as against which there would be an equal right of counter-dogmatism.’