Thus far, I have focused on the changes in the control of force associated with private delivery of security services. In this chapter I look at the private financing of security – examining how non-state actors, directly or not, affect the resources through which violence is controlled. As chapter one suggests, non-state actors – particularly transnational non-state actors – dedicated to maintaining a presence in parts of the world where the state is weak are an important source of demand for private security. Non-state actors finance security in a variety of ways, though, subsidizing state, rebel, or paramilitary forces as well as hiring PSCs. It is increasingly the case that non-state actors have both direct and indirect impact on the financial resources available for security in weak states. This chapter explores the consequences of that impact for control of force in weak states.

The optimists and pessimists once again suggest different consequences. Pessimists argue that transnational financing is a fundamental challenge to the state's control of consequential incentives that may also undermine the coherence and legitimacy of states. More optimistic visions see non-state financing of security as simply an indication of state weakness – and a tool that can bolster security in a way that enhances short-term functional control. The rosiest scenario might imagine that non-state financing could, particularly when reinforced with education about the proper behavior of security forces, even subsidize order so as to help generate the political coherence necessary for improving the strength of a weak state, potentially contributing to greater coherence, and improving the likelihood that force will be integrated with prevailing international norms.