1 - Introduction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 October 2009
Summary
This book explores the effects of democratic politics on the use of coercive diplomacy in international crises. It considers how the institutions and practices of democracy influence a government's decision to threaten force to resolve a dispute, the way the targets of such threats choose to respond, who wins and who loses in bargaining, and most important, whether the matter is settled through the threat of force or through its actual use – that is, war. I argue in these pages that democracy generates distinctive patterns and outcomes because of the public nature of political competition within democratic polities. Open deliberation and debate, essential for representation and accountability domestically, have profound effects on whether and when democratic governments can effectively use threats of force to prevail in international crises.
Contrary to the pessimism one often sees in scholarly and popular opinion, I find that these effects are not wholly negative. It has long been common to argue that the open nature of democratic polities is a liability in international politics. In his massive Study of War, for example, Quincy Wright argues that the demands of public deliberation and participation make democratic states “ill-adapted to the successful use of threats and violence as instruments of foreign policy” (Wright 1965, p. 842). For a threat to be successful, the target must be convinced that the issuer really means to carry it out. Democratic governments, however, are at every turn susceptible to criticism from domestic oppositions, which can raise doubts about their willingness and ability to act. Autocratic governments, on the other hand, can more easily conceal or suppress their internal divisions.
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- Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy , pp. 1 - 20Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2001