A central concern and fundamental problem for any scientist is the issue of conceptualising an object of inquiry. In terms of social inquiry the answer to this problem can seem deceptively simple. Since society consists of people, social scientists should study people. Yet simplicity has its own problems and despite the fact that many social scientists (and politicians) accept the equation ‘society = people + their activity’, many reject it. For what, in the first instance, are people? How are people formed and what properties do they possess? And is that all society is – people? Is there not more to the social world than simply people – what of that excess element, the consequences of their activity? What if their activity takes on an independent ontological existence and forms part of the circumstances in which people act and hence reacts back upon them? One does not have to be a Marxist to accept that people act but not in circumstances of their own choosing. And what if these circumstances construct those people rather than those people constructing these circumstances? In which case, social inquiry should concern itself with the circumstances rather than with the people. Two simple views of society: society is people, or society is the circumstances within which people are formed.

The opposition between these two views has played a fundamental role in structuring all forms of social inquiry, including IR.