Multilateral negotiations today constitute the most prominent method by which states address joint problems, resolve disagreements, and formulate common norms in world politics. Yet international relations (IR) scholars still grapple with the most fundamental questions raised by this practice, pertaining to issues of efficiency and distribution in international cooperation. Why do some negotiations lead to agreements that exploit all possible joint gains, whereas others collapse or produce suboptimal bargains? Why are some states more successful than others in securing benefits from multilateral agreements?

This book is about the influence wielded by the formal leaders of multilateral negotiations – those state or supranational representatives that chair and direct negotiations in the major decision bodies of international organizations and conferences. The book offers a systematic theoretical and empirical exploration of formal leadership in multilateral bargaining. It conceives of the chairmanship as a power platform in international politics, and argues that actors in control of this office enjoy unique opportunities to shape the outcomes of multilateral negotiations. Formal leaders fulfill functions that make it more likely for negotiations to succeed and possess privileged resources that make it possible to steer negotiations toward the agreements they most prefer.

In the book, I present and test a theory of formal leadership that synthesizes elements of rational choice institutionalism and general bargaining theory. The theory develops a coherent argument for the origin of the chairmanship as an institutional form in decision-making, for the power resources of negotiation chairs, and for the effects of formal leadership on the outcomes of multilateral bargaining.