Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-xm8r8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-05T12:26:10.099Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

7 - The strategic effects of supply guarantees: the raincheck game

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 September 2009

George Norman
Affiliation:
Tufts University, Massachusetts
Jacques-François Thisse
Affiliation:
Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium
Get access

Summary

Introduction

Why might a firm sell its product at prices less than marginal cost? If each firm posts its price in advance of learning its demand, the quantity demanded could exceed the maximum quantity a firm wishes to supply when competitors charge higher than expected prices or demand is strong. Such a firm then faces a choice of whether to ration its customers or to serve all demand. There are many reasons why a firm might forgo the strategy of short-run profit maximisation and serve all demand. Among them are encouraging shopping by consumers who buy both advertised and unadvertised goods, maintaining a positive reputation with consumers, and inducing risk-averse consumers with significant shopping costs to seek out low prices by removing the risk of finding the store stocked out.

Some firms effectively commit to serve all demand by offering ‘rainchecks’. Many supermarket chains in the United States issue coupons to consumers to buy items advertised at special prices when the super-market runs out of its supply. The consumer can then return after the store restocks and obtain the product at the special price. Trade deals with manufacturers often enable stores to offer special low prices, so offering to sell the good after the sale period at the low price is an offer to sell at a price below marginal cost. While maintaining goodwill is an obvious explanation, there are at least two others. First, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulates advertising.

Type
Chapter
Information
Market Structure and Competition Policy
Game-Theoretic Approaches
, pp. 143 - 160
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2000

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×