Between early 1932 and early 1934, the international order created at the Paris peace conference and modified by the Washington and Locarno treaties and the war debt and reparations settlements came under sustained assault. British foreign policy had to ensure that Britain's economic, political, and strategic interests tied to these arrangements were safeguarded. Generally speaking, since 1921, that policy had been fashioned by finding grounds to co-operate with the major Powers: France, Italy, and Germany in Europe via the League, Locarno, and the war debt and reparations agreements; Japan in the Far East through the three Washington treaties; and, because of its interest in naval affairs and economic diplomacy, the United States by resolving the cruiser question and making the Dawes and Young settlements work. Some division had developed in the foreign-policy-making elite between those like Vansittart, Dalton, and Tyrrell who promoted ‘world leadership’ policies, whether they focused more on France or more on Germany, and ‘atlanticists’ like MacDonald. As evidenced by Henderson, these ideas were not mutually exclusive, and this produced a balanced foreign policy in pursuit of the global balance of power. But as the constellation of international power began changing after 1932, so did the equilibrium between the two main wings of the British elite. The ‘world leaders’ came to dominate policy-making.