At the beginning of 1935, British strategic foreign policy was changing. While the British had not yet abandoned either arms limitation or the League, the events of the next six months demonstrated that these were uncertain instruments. This was especially so because Japan and Germany were now absent from Geneva. Thus, the British were forced to experiment with other ways of protecting their interests in the uncertain ‘period of deterrence’.

Here, Soviet Russia played an important, if awkward role. This was due to a clash of sensibilities. Soviet Russia sought security by means of alliances. If necessary, these alliances could be covered by the cloak of collective security, but Moscow's real goal was the promise of military support, something evident in the Eastern Locarno talks. This ran counter to the British desire to manage and control Germany's rearmament, since Berlin not only was unwilling to enter the Eastern Locarno agreements, but also was using them to fend off calls for arms limitation. Any Franco-Soviet agreement was potentially both antithetical to working through the League and dangerous to Britain if its Locarno commitments were increased. However, while castigating the Soviets for a return to pre-1914 methods, the British themselves also stepped outside the realm of collective action, signing the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in 1935. With Germany squared, the British still had to deal with Japan, a task made difficult because the collapse of naval arms limitation talks in December 1934 had resulted from Tokyo's intransigence over naval issues.