The problem of evil ‘proper’ is the prima facie logical incompatibility of the existence of a perfect being – a being who would be omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good inter alia – and evil. Other problems challenge perfect-being theism with plausible contingencies other than its bare existence, evidence for which is observed, for example, that this is not the best of all possible worlds. I count all of the original problem of these other problems as problems of evil and identify ‘the problem of evil’ with the family of them. In this chapter arguments in a series of this family are considered, starting with ‘Epicurus’ old questions' made into the Argument from Evil, proceeding to the Argument from the World's Not Being a Best World, next to the Argument from the World's Not Being a Best Divinely Creatable World, after that to the Argument from Not Being a Best Divine Bet World, then to the Argument from There Being a Better World Than This One, and finally to a rearrangement of that argument into a Dilemmatic Argument that rearranges the previous one under the disjunction, either there is a best possible world or there is not.