This chapter is principally concerned with elucidating the categorial determinations of “personality” and “person” in Hegel's thought. Both concepts assume a central role in the Philosophy of Right insofar as Hegel explicitly defines personality as the moment of self-conscious freedom belonging to the will itself: “The personality of the will” (§39) thus presents itself as the necessary condition for “every kind of right” (§40). Rights can be ascribed “only to a person.” Hegel distinguishes between the concept of right in the narrower sense (“abstract right”) and the broader concept of moral or ethical rights and demands. He interprets the moment of personality as the sufficient condition for ascribing rights to an individual in the sense of abstract right (the right to acquire property, the right to enter into contract, or the right to appropriate punishment in the case of illegal and criminal acts). In addition, Hegel also claims to have provided an explicit analysis of self-consciousness as the consciousness of freedom in terms of a logical determination of the moment of personality. Standing expressly within the tradition of Kant and Fichte, Hegel thus attempts to explicate philosophically the single foundation of all justified rights and demands by reference to the concept of personality.

The following remarks will interpret the logical determinations of the principle of personality and the analysis of self-conscious freedom that that principle implies.