Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 The Puzzle of Single-Party Dominance
- PART 1 THE MACRO-PERSPECTIVE
- 2 A Theory of Single-Party Dominance and Opposition Party Development
- 3 Dominant Party Advantages and Opposition Party Failure, 1930s–1990s
- PART 2 THE MICRO-PERSPECTIVE
- PART 3 IMPLICATIONS
- References
- Index
2 - A Theory of Single-Party Dominance and Opposition Party Development
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 The Puzzle of Single-Party Dominance
- PART 1 THE MACRO-PERSPECTIVE
- 2 A Theory of Single-Party Dominance and Opposition Party Development
- 3 Dominant Party Advantages and Opposition Party Failure, 1930s–1990s
- PART 2 THE MICRO-PERSPECTIVE
- PART 3 IMPLICATIONS
- References
- Index
Summary
In his influential study, T. J. Pempel wrote that successful dominant parties create a “virtuous cycle of dominance” to reinforce their rule (1990: 16). But, once established, how is this cycle sustained? What are the mechanisms that reproduce the dominant party equilibrium and how is the cycle eventually broken?
In this chapter, I develop a theory of dominant party persistence and failure. At root, this is a question about the transformation of undercompetitive party systems into fully competitive democracies. Since the electoral arena remains open in dominant party systems, explaining equilibrium dominance requires a theory of party competition. Yet the standard theories assume an unbiased or fair electoral market for votes and are thus inappropriate for studying dominant party systems where the incumbent's advantages systematically bias electoral competition in its favor. I theorize how these advantages help dominant parties virtually win elections before election day by forcing opposition parties, if they form, to compete with policy appeals that are extremist relative to the preference of the average voter. As a result, challenger parties seek both personnel and votes from among the most anti-status quo constituencies.
A crucial question is not just how systematic disadvantages affect challengers, but also how the cycle of dominance is sustained. I argue that dominant parties rise and fall primarily with the state's control over the economy. As long as the federal public bureaucracy is politically controlled, incumbent dominant parties can divert resources from the public budget, especially from state-owned enterprises, to partisan coffers.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Why Dominant Parties LoseMexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective, pp. 33 - 70Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007