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5 - SCANDALS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POPULAR OUTRAGE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 July 2009

Aníbal Pérez-Liñán
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh
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Summary

To what extent are scandals capable of compromising public support for the president? Although the six presidents discussed in Chapter 2 took office with the support of significant majorities, they suffered considerable losses in public approval throughout the process leading to the impeachment crisis. The average president in this group started his term with an approval rating of 64 percent but left office with a rating of just 23 percent. An overall declining trend in approval ratings is not uncommon among presidents in office, but these cases are notable for the level of deterioration and for the ultimate consequences of the process. The escalation of public discontent fueled mass protests that ultimately encouraged impeachment proceedings against the president.

Although impeachment charges in each case resulted from specific accusations against the president – with the exception of Bucaram, who was declared mentally unfit after a long series of exposés – the conventional wisdom suggests that unpopular economic reforms and poor economic performance were important factors explaining the emergence of public unrest in those countries. On the one hand, the historical narratives presented in the second chapter suggest that at least in three cases (Bucaram, González Macchi, and Pérez) popular protest was in part a direct reaction to the administration's attempts to impose neoliberal reforms. On the other hand, students of advanced industrial democracies have consistently shown that macroeconomic performance is one of the best predictors of public support for the government.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

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