Part 1 of this book documented five objections to human reproductive cloning and subjected them to critical analysis. What this analysis revealed is the fundamental weakness of those objections. Some objections are religious or moral arguments that, by definition, cannot be proven. Other objections are susceptible of proof, but cloning opponents have put forward little or no social, psychological, or scientific evidence to support them. Many of the arguments are rooted in a single, gross scientific error, namely, the false notion that human clones are copies of their DNA donors. Even safety concerns have been greatly overstated; with time, as cloning technology improves, they may disappear altogether.

In Parts 2 and 3, I will return to this critique of the five objections, and use it to explain why anticloning laws not only are bad public policy but also are unconstitutional.

Part 1 has also shown how the five objections reflect, reinforce, and inspire stereotypes about human clones. I am now in a position to provide a concise summary of those stereotypes.

First, the warning that cloning offends God is an objection to hubris rather than to a particular type of human. However, the objection encourages the religious right to believe that human clones are evil. Similarly, the related objection that cloning is unnatural encourages the environmentalist left to conclude that human clones are unnatural, abnormal, strange, artificial, and inferior. Frequent references to Frankenstein and its warning against scientific meddling with nature imply that human clones are grotesque, immoral, and dangerous.