It is pertinent here to recall the most salient features of the context of this problem. First, from 1936, annual Romanian plans of campaign foresaw the facilitation of Red Army transit: “If Russia remains allied with France and intends to support Czechoslovakia we will need to permit the Russian forces to cross Romania in order to assist the Czech army.” The Romanian General Staff campaign plan for 1938 addressed the “degree of probability of war on the different fronts,” East, West, and South, or Russian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian. The most threatening front was clearly the Western or Hungarian. In view of Russia's treaty with France, Russian policy as enunciated at the League of Nations, and the attitude of the other powers, especially Hungary, the General Staff judged that in 1938 “war on the eastern [front] appears little likely.” In fact, plans for 1938 were massively and almost exclusively concerned about the “front de vest.” Document after document is entitled “Front de vest.” In the event of a large war, a war with Germany, on the Romanian West front, the assistance of the Red Army would have been desperately essential.

On the other hand, we subsequently saw that, on the firing of Titulescu, the Romanian Foreign Office and the court signaled unmistakably, not that transit rights of the Red Army would absolutely in all cases be refused, but rather their distinct disinclination, a visceral reluctance, to admit Soviet troops to the country.