In chapters 2–5, I developed a detailed account of emotions and desires as felt evaluations and of their rational and conceptual interconnections with judgment, especially evaluative judgment. It is now time to return to the two problems of practical reason raised in chapter 1, namely the motivational problem and the deliberative problem, and exploit this account in solving them. My concern in this chapter will be the motivational problem; I shall address the deliberative problem in chapter 7.

THE MOTIVATIONAL PROBLEM REVISITED

The motivational problem, recall, is the problem of how we can have control over what we are motivated to do by exercising our judgment. As I argued in chapter 1, the kind of control at issue in the motivational problem is very different from that which we exercise over ordinary objects in our environment. For the latter kind of control we exercise simply by exploiting causal connections, as when I control the computer I am typing this on by pressing keys or moving the mouse. Although I need not know the precise nature of the causal relationship between my pressing these keys and, ultimately, words being printed on paper, I do know enough to use them to get the computer to do what I want, even in some cases overcoming a degree of recalcitrance when the computer “acts up” – in short, enough to control it. Control over our motivations, by contrast, involves an exploitation not merely of causal connections but of rational connections: it is my appreciation of the reasons for pursuing a course of action that can and should motivate me to act accordingly.