For centuries patronage relations have molded the political life of countries and their elite. In feudal and industrial societies patronage relationships were integral to the anatomy of the society itself. However, even in more highly structured political systems we find that these relationships continue to influence critical aspects of political life. Few countries have been so influenced by patronage relations as historical Russia and the Soviet Union. While many observers of Soviet and Russian politics acknowledge the importance of patronage to elite recruitment and behavior, it has largely remained an uncharted area of study. The approach here systematically explores patronage not only as a means of elite recruitment and mobility, but more importantly as a mechanism which structures the formation and development of national and subnational regimes.

The pervasiveness of patronage relations in the public arena stems in large part from the very nature of the political arena. The arena within which a political elite operates is dynamic and insecure. It is structured by the varied formal and informal mechanisms that ordinarily guide and moderate the behavior of politicians as they compete and promote their own interests.

The state, through its administrative institutions and rules, sets the most important formal parameters within which an elite operates. The expanding hierarchy of institutions within the modern bureaucracy generates ever more specialized functions and fixed rules which all aspiring officials must face.