Since Koskenniemi and Roth take us to task for a number of positions we do not hold, it is important to make clear precisely the issue we address in our chapter. Our analysis centers on regimes that profess adherence to a system of “genuine periodic” elections. We ask whether these regimes may restrict the rights of political actors who represent a demonstrable threat to such a system of electoral choice. Many legal commentators, especially in the wake of the 1991 Algerian elections, answer in the negative by arguing that the essence of a fair electoral system is equal opportunity for competition among all opposition groups. Our chapter asks whether contemporary international law supports this view. After an extensive review of international jurisprudence and State practice we found – subject to important qualifications and standards of proof – that it does not. The international community has of late made a sufficient commitment to the creation and strengthening of electoral institutions for it to find value in efforts at their preservation. We found little basis for two alternative answers to our question: that international law has nothing to say to States seeking guidance on whether restrictions on opposition actors are legal or illegal, or that States are affirmatively prohibited from imposing such restrictions.

The basis for our answer is neither, as Roth suggests, commitment to a comprehensive international blueprint of democratic legitimism nor, as Koskenniemi claims, viewing national political struggles through a distorting “external” lens that either wholly fails to comprehend how the parties perceive themselves or selectively accepts the government's characterization of parties' “democratic” (or “undemocratic”) nature.