The Greek crisis of the 1940s provides a good perspective from which to view both Great Britain's dependency on the United States as the former tried to continue in a great power role and the ambivalence that resulted from that relationship. Because the story of the Anglo- Greek crisis has already been well told by other writers, one needs only to sketch it here to provide background for the Anglo-American relations of the period. First, however, one should consider what lay behind British interest in Greek affairs at that time, particularly because in subsequent years an enormous flow of rhetoric both attacking and defending Britain's involvement had tended to obscure its original purpose. Basically, the British motive was quite simple, i.e., to prevent Greece from coming under Soviet domination. Fears that the Russians, as they moved into eastern Europe, would gain important, if not predominant, influence in Greece and a foothold in the Mediterranean, thereby forming a potential threat to Britain's connections to the East, were key factors in Whitehall's policy. As early as January 1942 the Foreign Office saw the possibility, indeed probability, that defeat of the Axis would bring Eastern Europe under the political sway of the Soviet Union despite the fact that the Russians were at the moment reeling before a German onslaught. D. F. Howard, head of the Southern Department and responsible for Balkan affairs, expressed Whitehall's fears succinctly.