When a modern military force seizes power in a democracy, the leaders face a number of dilemmas as they seek to institutionalize their rule. As their rule is born of a state of exception, they must early on seek to establish two things: (a) decision-making structures that will clearly distribute authority and (b) succession and promotion mechanisms to designate officeholders. These two goals require the establishment of an internal balance of power as a first priority. Subsequently, military regimes born of a state of exception must seek to regularize their forms of interaction with civil society, restoring the links through which information flows to decision makers and, eventually, by which assent is granted by citizens to state policies. As one Blanco politician who ran for high office put it, echoing Talleyrand: “Bayonets are good for everything except sitting on.” This second external dimension, or phase, of institutionalization is necessary if the state is to end its isolation from society, but sooner or later it inevitably must give rise to acute dilemmas regarding liberalization and participation.

The collegial military-technocratic rule that emerged in Uruguay after 1973 ensured complete physical control of the country. The nation's compact size and small population permitted levels of surveillance and social control that reached the upper limits of the authoritarian ideal type.