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9 - The aftermath of Wilson's peacemaking

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 September 2009

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Summary

Twice defeated in the Senate, the Versailles Treaty lacked any realistic prospect for ratification by the United States. Wilson's intransigence had sacrificed the opportunity for American membership in the League. Rather than make any concession to achieve this goal, he looked to the 1920 election as a “solemn referendum” on the treaty. Insisting that the nation faced a choice between internationalism and isolationism, he hoped it would endorse his uncompromising stance. Republicans welcomed this challenge. The president's extreme position enabled them to unite for the campaign. They felt confident that American voters would sustain the Senate's refusal to approve the treaty without reservations. Opposition to Wilson's League united all Republicans from irreconcilables to mild reservationists. As long as Democrats followed their ailing leader in the White House, Republicans knew they could not lose the treaty fight. Regardless of the presidential election's outcome, the Senate would remain substantially unchanged. Even Democratic victories in all senatorial races in 1920 would fail to provide a two-thirds majority for the treaty in the new session. In short, the “solemn referendum” could not possibly vindicate Wilson's leadership in international affairs. He had lost touch with political reality in his vain search for control of American foreign relations.

Adhering steadfastly to his all-or-nothing stance, the president refused to take any action that might save the treaty. His new secretary of state, Bainbridge Colby, informed him about Hitchcock's views on possible initiatives.

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Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition
The Treaty Fight in Perspective
, pp. 251 - 289
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1987

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