In the previous chapters we considered how far individuality of soul and of body extends in relation to God. In this chapter will be considered how individual free-will operates in that relationship.

If God knows beforehand how man will conduct himself in the future, how can man be free to choose? This problem has long held a powerful fascination for the religious mind. In mediaeval Jewish thought the problem is known as that of yedi'ah (‘knowledge’, i.e. God's foreknowledge) and beḥirah (‘choice’, i.e. human freedom to choose). It being generally acknowledged in Judaism that the doctrine of God's omniscience embraces the sure and certain knowledge by Him of all future events and it being generally accepted as axiomatic that human beings are free, at least within limits, to pursue good and reject evil, the problem arises of how both beliefs can be mutually compatible and simultaneously held. If, long before a particular man is born, God knows to the last detail and with complete certainty all the deeds that man will perform during his lifetime, how can that man be free to do otherwise? To deny God's foreknowledge seems to suggest ignorance and limitation in God and hence appears to be incompatible with God's utter perfection. To deny human freedom, on the other hand, seems to make nonsense of the Jewish religion, which contains innumerable appeals to man to choose the good and which informs him that he will be rewarded for so doing, but punished if he does evil. From the middle ages down to the present the problem has been considered by a succession of Jewish thinkers.