As Jewish law developed, the Babylonian Talmud came to be seen as the main source of the whole legal system and the final Court of Appeal, so to speak. The Babylonian Talmud itself, at least in the halakhic portions of the work, became a kind of law code, with its main thrust in the direction of practical halakhic decisions. Historically speaking, this view of the Talmud is incorrect. On the contrary, the central feature of this gigantic work consists of purely academic investigation into legal theory. There is, of course, some practical halakhic material in the Talmud. There are, for example, many instances of case-law and of practical decisions. These practical aspects are, however, incidental to the theoretical. It is the argument itself that matters most, both to the Amoraim themselves and to the editors.

First, it should be noted, that the Mishnah, to which the Bavli is appended, is largely theoretical in its thrust. All the mishnayot dealing with the sacrificial system – the whole of Seder Kodashim, with the exception of Ḥullin; the first seven chapters of Yoma; chapters 5 through to 9 of Pesaḥim; Shekalim; Ḥagigah; parts of Rosh ha-Shanah and Sukkah – can only have been academic, since the Temple had long been destroyed at the time when the Mishnah was edited. This applies also to the discussions regarding the obligation to bring a sin-offering, even in the ‘practical’ tractate of Shabbat.