INTRODUCTION

The investigation of the previous chapter has led us to the point of having to revise most of the conventional beliefs about “law and order.” Three further questions have emerged that will guide the inquiry in the next few chapters. The first question deals with the problem of how norms in general function and which different norm-types exist. The second question concerns the prescriptive force of norms, i.e., why and in what circumstances certain norms provide “reasons” which decision-makers will find persuasive, and to which they will therefore defer. Finally, there is the question of an appropriate demarcation-criterion allowing us to distinguish between “legal” and other types of norms.

In this chapter I intend to take up the first problem and also tackle the question of the “emergence” of norms through either spontaneous generation or through explicit procedures. While the issue of “tacit rules” has already been dealt with, the generation of explicit conventions, i.e., rules and norms in intersubjectively communicable form, needs elaboration. Furthermore, the various distinguishing characteristics of several norm-types makes it necessary to deal first with the “generic” features of all norms and rules. I maintain that all rules and norms are problem-solving devices for dealing with the recurrent issues of social life: conflict and cooperation. Here, the public-choice perspective provides a useful starting-point. To the extent that scarcity of time, of space, or of available “goods” exists, individual actors cannot achieve their goals without interfering with each other's pursuits and/or experiencing actual conflict.