After Malplaquet the strategy which Marlborough and Eugène had followed lost its validity, and as a result the campaigns of 1710 and 1711 in France and the Low Countries were bound to be inconclusive. The allies after Marlborough's three victories and Eugène's expulsion of the French from Italy had concentrated on forcing the enemy to fight a major set-piece battle which they confidently expected would result in the final destruction of the main French army, and so compel Louis to accept peace on allied terms. The survival of Villars's army disproved this belief, something that Marlborough, but not Eugène, came to realise. From the autumn of 1709 it was the defensive strategy adopted by the French that became valid: Villars had only to avoid defeat in a major battle for a compromise peace settlement to become inevitable, and he had already demonstrated his ability – on the Moselle in 1705 – to checkmate the allies without having to risk one.

In the campaigns of 1710 and 1711 Marlborough executed a succession of brilliant manoeuvres to out-flank French defensive lines, and he covered a number of sieges deep in enemy territory, but he did not succeed in pinning Villars down and forcing him to fight under unfavourable conditions. When Marlborough did find himself with an option to fight a battle it was only when Villars faced him from behind defences as strong as those at Malplaquet, and no assault was attempted.