Introduction

Self-recognition in nonhuman primates is often equated with mirror selfrecognition (Anderson, 1984; Gallup, 1970; Itakura, 1987a,b; Povinelli, 1987). Nevertheless, for humans, “it is the ability to recognize and respond to self independent of contingency which represents the important developmental milestone in self-recognition” (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979b, p. 218). Human children begin to recognize their contingent-independent image in photographs only after mirror self-recognition (MSR), with most children at 22 months of age correctly labeling a photograph of themselves among photographs of other infants, and some infants doing so as early as 16 months (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979a, p. 12). The recognition of a contingency independent self in photographs is relatively unstudied in primates (but see Miles, SAAH16; Patterson & Cohn, SAAH17). The only previous instance described is open to interpretation: The sign-using chimpanzee Lucy, after observing an image of herself and her cat (which had died three months previously), signed “Lucy's cat, Lucy's cat” repeatedly for ten minutes as she stared at the picture (Temerlin, 1977).

This instance suggests not only that Lucy recognized her own image and her cat's, but also that she viewed the cat as her own – as a possession. Although possession in nonhuman primates has been studied in the context of control over objects (Kummer, 1973; Thierry, Wunderlich, & Gueth, 1989; Torii, 1975), there is no evidence that possession in these primates is mediated by a self-concept or a concept of the other, such that they view these objects as symbolically representing themselves or another.