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2 - The Rise of the German Problem: Bismarck's Foreign Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 October 2009

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Summary

Upstart Germany

Once Bismarck had put together the German Empire, his principal diplomatic achievement lay in postponing its confrontation with the rest of Europe. By defeating Austria and France while unifying Germany under Prussia, Bismarck could not help but profoundly challenge the European balance of power. A coalition of hostile powers was nearly inevitable, and indeed appeared as early as 1875, when Britain and Russia both made clear they would not tolerate another German victory over France. Hence, that “nightmare of coalitions,” which haunted Bismarck and ultimately did destroy the Reich that he had created. But while Bismarck led Germany, the nightmare never took substance. Can it therefore be said that Bismarck had a foreign policy which, if continued, would have preserved his Reich, a policy his successors were too ambitious or inept to continue?

Bismarck's Defensive Alliances

Essentially, Bismarck's celebrated foreign policy consisted of a complex set of agreements meant to keep all the other powers perpetually off balance. Austria, Italy, and Russia were embraced in German alliances, thus denying their support to French plans for revenge and containing their own rivalries with each other. The rivalry of Russia and Austria-Hungary was to be contained by their mutual alliance with Germany, the Dreikaiserbund, while the tensions between Italy and Austria-Hungary were to be controlled by Germany within the Triple Alliance. Meanwhile, the French were encouraged in those colonial ambitions that guaranteed friction with Britain and Italy. Finally, Bismarck sought to maneuver the British into a certain dependence by encouraging them to guarantee Turkey against Russia and France.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1978

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