The 1944 White Paper promise to take powers to enquire into restrictive practices was implemented in the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act of 1948 – superficially a clear line of progression. In fact we may trace the same twists and turns the previous chapter outlined for the period that occurred between 1940 and 1944. This chapter considers two questions concerning the transition from Coalition to Labour policy on restrictive practices. Why did it take until March 1948 for a bill to be introduced when Dalton had promised legislation for the 1945–6 session and when draft bills were ready in 1945? Why did Labour adhere to a form of legislation on cartels decided by the Coalition government when its own election manifesto promised to prohibit ‘anti-social’ restrictive practices?

The answer to these questions lies in the nature of the interaction between British businessmen, especially as represented in the FBI, and the United States. The significant forces shaping British anti-cartel legislation in the 1940s were thus similar to those identified in Germany and Japan at the time. This chapter looks closely at how these, rather than the concerns and outlook of the Labour Party and its allies, should determine government policy.

In pursuing these themes, this chapter shows that the period of 1944 to 1948 was key in the development of British competition policy. The postwar Labour Government consolidated a model of state–industry relations which, though markedly more interventionist than previous peace-time governments' had more in common with Lionel Robbins' strategy for state involvement in the economy than anything deriving from socialist thought.