In numerous European societies during most of the early modern period many producers – even in proto-industry – were organized into guilds or guild-like organizations. What effect did this have on these economies? Some argue that guilds acted as cartels, which obtained monopoly ‘rents’ for their members and exerted malign effects on the wider economy; others claim that guilds were ineffectual, that their negative impact has been exaggerated, or even that they were positively beneficial.

This debate can be broken down into three separate issues. The first is the question of the date to which guild regulation survived in Europe. Did guilds retain real powers into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? Or had they, by 1600 or 1700, degenerated into merely formal organizations with only remnants of their medieval powers?

The second issue is whether guilds ever acted as effective monopolists. Did they actually succeed in restricting entry, limiting output or setting minimum prices? Did they try to do so but fail in practice? Or did they in fact have different aims altogether, such as quality maintenance and consumer protection?

The third debate concerns whether guilds were harmful or beneficial. Did their monopolistic activities impose deadweight costs on the economy and reduce the flexibility needed for economic growth? Or were any costs they may have created outweighed by the benefits they generated by overcoming imperfections in markets for capital, quality or technological innovation?