Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of maps
- Introduction
- 1 “There has been much bluff”
- 2 Bellicose nonbelligerent
- 3 “The most impatient of all Italians”
- 4 June–September 1940: Duce strategy in the shadow of Sea Lion
- 5 The attack on Greece
- 6 To the Berghof: Italy's end as a great power
- Conclusion: The meaning of Fascist Italy's last war
- Appendix 1 The diaries of Count Galeazzo Ciano
- Appendix 2 Military expenditure: Italy and the powers compared
- Abbreviations
- Notes
- A note on sources
- Frequently cited works
- Index
2 - Bellicose nonbelligerent
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of maps
- Introduction
- 1 “There has been much bluff”
- 2 Bellicose nonbelligerent
- 3 “The most impatient of all Italians”
- 4 June–September 1940: Duce strategy in the shadow of Sea Lion
- 5 The attack on Greece
- 6 To the Berghof: Italy's end as a great power
- Conclusion: The meaning of Fascist Italy's last war
- Appendix 1 The diaries of Count Galeazzo Ciano
- Appendix 2 Military expenditure: Italy and the powers compared
- Abbreviations
- Notes
- A note on sources
- Frequently cited works
- Index
Summary
I … believe– even if we march on separate paths– that Destiny will nevertheless continue to bind us together. If National Socialist Germany is destroyed by the western democracies, Fascist Italy would also face a hard future.
Hitler to Mussolini, 3 September 1939The limits of abstention
“Verrat!” By the morning of 1 September, despite the agitation of the preceding days, Mussolini was temporarily calm. He solicited from Hitler a message publicly releasing Italy from its obligations, then composed with Ciano the resolution declaring Italy's nonbelligerency. The Council of Ministers promulgated it that afternoon at a meeting in which Mussolini surveyed the situation in his habitual off-the-record speech. Despite rumors of “fantastic” plans to descend on the Po valley prepared by “those Gascons on the French General Staff,” he was nevertheless confident that for the moment, at least, the belligerents would leave Italy alone. But he was far from happy. One witness noted that for Mussolini neutrality was “a failure, a betrayal.” Another recalled him muttering to himself “Verrat! Verrat! [Betrayal! Betrayal!].” Mussolini had the “mortified expression of one who was doing something popular against his will.” Even Starace and the minister of popular culture, Dino Alfieri, the most conspicuous war enthusiasts of the previous weeks, congratulated Ciano on his part in Mussolini's decision.
The Allies were equally relieved. Earlier in the year the British had contemplated a “knock-out blow” against Italy on the assumption that it would join Germany at the outset. But despite crushing Allied naval superiority in the Mediterranean, French enthusiasm for an immediate offensive against Libya with their North African army had oscillated wildly in the months before war.
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- Information
- Mussolini Unleashed, 1939–1941Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War, pp. 44 - 86Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1982