CONTROL AND INTERFERENCE

As head of the ‘Delian League’ from its foundation in 478/7 BC, Athens was in a position to monitor and control the long-distance movement of grain. The destruction of the Persian fleet at the battle of Eurymedon (?469 BC) left the Athenians without a serious rival in the Aegean sea, and their supremacy was thereafter not in doubt until the Sicilian débâcle of 413 BC. The career of the Athenian navy was not unchequered. In particular, something in the region of 200–250 ships were lost in Egypt in 454 BC. But no state or combination of states took the opportunity to mount a serious challenge to the Athenians. Again, the Athenians were never in a position to control all the major sea-routes. However, for geographical reasons it was relatively easy to monitor the route from the Black Sea, most of the grain imported into Old Greece came this way, and Athenian authority remained more or less unchallenged in this area throughout the period.

It does not follow from the apparent fact that the Athenians controlled this or that grain-route that they actually exploited their position of power at the expense of other states. It is appropriate to begin by addressing this concrete issue in relation to the Hellespont. Did the Athenians detain at Byzantium ships heading for the ports of other states, and did they actively steer grain ships toward the Piraeus?

The ‘Old Oligarch’, an anonymous critic of Athenian democracy of the third quarter of the fifth century, expresses a view only on the issue of Athenian interventionism at the expense of other states.