Introduction

As very simply and decisively stated by Lord Holt in an anonymous case of 1701, over many centuries it was common belief that ‘a corporation is not indictable, but the particular members of it are’.

Nowadays, when dealing with the criminal responsibility of organizations, that statement cannot be upheld any more. In fact, as already called for at to outset of the last century by one of the then leading German-Austrian criminal law professors, Franz von Liszt, criminal responsibility for legal and collective entities has been widely achieved, though only to varying degrees and in different forms.

In most European countries the national legislatures have created possibilities to hold legal and collective entities criminally responsible. In so far, one can witness an approximation to the Anglo-American jurisdictions, which have known a form of ‘corporate criminal liability’ since the beginning of the last century.

With introducing criminal responsibility of legal and collective entities, many legislatures of the large industrial nations paid tribute to the ever increasing economic development followed by an increase of ‘corporate crimes’. At present, hardly a day passes without media reports of criminal offences committed by enterprises and their executive personnel.

There is no doubt that many legislatures are both aware of this criminal conduct and determined to fight this by new legal measures and sanctions. It is, however, equally true that the legal and procedural problems involved are still far from having been solved in a satisfying and uniform manner.