Theory-of-mind development

The only games in town

Three different views, all well represented in this volume, have been prominent in the lively debate on the origins of children's theory of mind. They are the theory-theory, the simulation theory, and the modularity view, and they are, according to Gopnik (this volume) ‘the only games in town’. Proponents of all three views agree that during their pre-school years children develop a theory of mind which underlies their ability to understand social interaction by the attribution of mental states to themselves and to others. But this ‘theory of mind’ is not the same for the theory-theorist, the simulation theorist, and the modularity theorist. Indeed, they may not even mean the same thing by the term ‘theory’.

Samet (1993) distinguishes between taxonomic theories and postulational ones, relating the former to a weaker and the latter to a stronger sense of ‘theory’. Taxonomic theories are conceptual systems which help to organise our experience within a domain. The concepts mediate our understanding of the domain in question, and can be used to explain phenomena in that domain. However, the concepts are not of unobservables which are postulated to exist in order to provide explanation of the phenomena. Although mental states may not be directly observable, we do have some experiential knowledge of their existence.