In the short space of time since the collapse of the Soviet Union in late December 1991, Russia's policy towards Central Asia has come full circle. After an initial period of transitional neglect, during which certain regional powers, namely Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and some Western powers, especially the United States, attempted to fill the power vacuum created by the breakup of the USSR, Russia has lately made a concerted effort to regain some of the lost ground in the former Soviet Muslim republics. In an attempt to deter other powers from filling the gap, Russia has taken a series of firm steps which point to an increasingly assertive foreign policy and which lay the foundations for what could crystallise as Russia's Central Asia policy. Whatever the domestic pressures behind this development, President Boris Yeltsin and his Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev have personally been obliged to support this change, realising that no matter how much Russia needs closer ties with the West, practical political and security considerations may require that it seek to maintain a determining influence in Central Asia.

Obviously a variety of factors have motivated them in this direction, but perhaps none more so than their growing concern about a perceived threat from two sources: ethnonationalism and Islamic radicalism.