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9 - God Concepts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 October 2009

Patrick McNamara
Affiliation:
Boston University
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Summary

Oh Lord, you are not only that than which a greater cannot be conceived, but you are also greater than what can be conceived.

– Anselm in Proslogion XV

Introduction

No account of the neurocognition of religious experience would be complete without some account of religious cognition. Central to religious cognition are concepts of supernatural agents and God.

As always, I bracket the issue of the metaphysical status of gods or God. For now I am simply trying to clarify how concepts representing supernatural agents function in the cognitive economy of the Mind. I begin therefore with a summary review of the origins and functions of God concepts.

Origins, Nature, and Functions of “God concepts”

God concepts are concepts about supernatural agents. Supernatural agents are often (although not invariably) beings with Minds like ours but no bodies. Most often the Minds of supernatural agents are more powerful than ours. When there is a high God who rules over lesser spiritual entities in the supernatural realm, this high God often has a mind so powerful that He or She can know virtually everything one is thinking or doing. A high God who is also a “full strategic access agent” knows everything you have ever thought or done or everything you will ever do or think. These “full strategic access agents” again point to the intimate relationships that exist between religion-related matters and the Self.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

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  • God Concepts
  • Patrick McNamara, Boston University
  • Book: The Neuroscience of Religious Experience
  • Online publication: 30 October 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511605529.010
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  • God Concepts
  • Patrick McNamara, Boston University
  • Book: The Neuroscience of Religious Experience
  • Online publication: 30 October 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511605529.010
Available formats
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To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • God Concepts
  • Patrick McNamara, Boston University
  • Book: The Neuroscience of Religious Experience
  • Online publication: 30 October 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511605529.010
Available formats
×