In the past twenty years or so the debate over moral realism has become a major focus of philosophical activity. Unfortunately, however, as a glance at the enormous literature the debate has generated makes clear, there is still no consensus as to what, precisely, it would take to be a moral realist (Sayre-McCord 1988a). My aims in this essay are thus twofold: first, to clarify what is at stake in the debate over realism, and, second, to explain why, as it seems to me, the realist's stance is so much more plausible than the alternatives.

MORAL REALISM VERSUS NIHILISM VERSUS EXPRESSIVISM

What do moral realists believe? The standard answer is that they believe two things. First, they believe that the sentences we use when we make moral claims – sentences like “Torturing babies is wrong” and “Keeping promises is right” – are capable of being either true or false, and, second, they believe that some such sentences really are true. Moral realism thus contrasts with two quite distinct kinds of view.

The first view shares realism's first commitment, but rejects the second. According to this first alternative, when we make claims about acts being right and wrong we intend thereby to make claims about the way the world is – we intend to say something capable of being either true or false – but none of these sentences really are true.