Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Figures
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction: The Ethnic Effect
- 2 Ethnic Attractors
- 3 Ethnic Attractors and Exogenous Constraints
- 4 Ethnic Voting in Romania
- 5 Ethnic Voting and Party System Stability
- 6 Ethnic Politics and Access
- 7 The Ethnic Effect on Regime Stability
- 8 Conclusions
- Appendix A The Model (Formal Version)
- Appendix B Measurements and Other Methods Issues
- References
- Index
4 - Ethnic Voting in Romania
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Figures
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction: The Ethnic Effect
- 2 Ethnic Attractors
- 3 Ethnic Attractors and Exogenous Constraints
- 4 Ethnic Voting in Romania
- 5 Ethnic Voting and Party System Stability
- 6 Ethnic Politics and Access
- 7 The Ethnic Effect on Regime Stability
- 8 Conclusions
- Appendix A The Model (Formal Version)
- Appendix B Measurements and Other Methods Issues
- References
- Index
Summary
Parties are at the center of political life for new voters in the diverse democracies of such nations as Romania, Hungary, Ecuador, and Chile. For parties' democratic functions to develop, party systems must stabilize over time. If parties are to benefit their constituencies by providing representation, policy expertise, and accessible political information, they must survive and establish a reputation. If the parties exist only for a short period or change frequently in other fundamental ways, they cannot credibly claim to represent the interests of a constituency in the legislature; nor can a fly-by-night party efficiently serve an information function for voters. In order to accept the party as representative and believe the information the party provides, voters must trust the party leadership. Such trust only develops in stable relationships. This stabilization of the party system is an integral component of party system institutionalization.
As noted in Chapter One, the development of stable relationships between parties and voters is particularly important in new democracies in order to counteract the destabilizing mobilization that results from economic deterioration immediately after democratization. According to Przeworski (1991), voters in new democracies hold incumbents accountable for deteriorating economic conditions associated with transition and vote them out of office. This change of government, in turn, derails any economic reform initiated by the incumbent and sends the country into a vicious circle of depression and political mobilization.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Ethnicity and Electoral Politics , pp. 60 - 82Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2006