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14 - The search for independence: Brazilian debt rescheduling in the 1980s and 1990s

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2009

Vinod K. Aggarwal
Affiliation:
University of California, Berkeley
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Summary

Brazil's debt strategy during the 1980s and early 1990s has been characterized by attempts to maintain as much policy independence as possible from its foreign creditors, be they commercial banks or the International Monetary Fund. Its strong economic position during part of the decade allowed it to adopt a particularly intransigent stance vis-á-vis its creditors.

Brazil's ability to successfully remove foreign creditors from a say in its policies varied considerably during the course of the nine periods of bargaining examined here. The first bargaining period began in August 1982 as banks sharply cut back credit to Brazil, and ended in May 1983 when the banks and Brazil failed to implement “Phase I” of the rescheduling agreement signed in February 1983. By the second period, from June 1983 to January 1984, the larger banks had managed to unify their coalition by coercing smaller lenders to participate in joint action. In the third period, from February 1984 to August 1985, an increase in worldwide demand for Brazil's exports in combination with the nation's shrinking supply of imports created a considerable trade surplus. Brazil's greater supply of debt-bargaining resources – and concern for political fallout from austerity measures – encouraged Brazil to secure significant concessions from the banks and IMF even thought it failed to comply with most of its IMF-approved measures during 1984.

The fourth period, composed of two rounds, began in September 1985 with the election of Tancredo Neves, Brazil's first civilian President in 21 years.

Type
Chapter
Information
Debt Games
Strategic Interaction in International Debt Rescheduling
, pp. 457 - 514
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1996

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