Delegation of Powers

Informed observers like the American international lawyer D. E. Rosenthal, whose critical comments on the political powers of the non-elected Commission were quoted in chapter 1, find the extensive delegation of powers to supranational institutions one of the most striking features of the constitutional architecture of the EC/EU. The member states of the EU, Miles Kahler writes, ‘have delegated more important and extensive functions to European institutions than has been the case with the members of other international or regional institutions. The Commission, for example, surpasses even the strong secretariat of an international organization’ (Kahler 1995: 85). Indeed, the Commission's monopoly of agenda-setting – arguably the key provision of the classic Community Method – is unique. Such broad delegation of powers presupposes a fiduciary relationship between the principals, the member states, and their agents, the European institutions. Hence the progressive restriction of the scope of delegation should be an indication of growing mistrust between national principals and supranational agents. This is actually the case, but before reviewing the evidence a few general comments on the logic of delegation might be helpful. For a more detailed discussion of this topic the interested reader is referred to a previous work (Majone 2005: 64–82).

Why do political principals choose to delegate some of their powers to agents rather than exercise those powers themselves? A number of reasons have been debated in the literature, ranging from delivering private benefits to favoured constituencies to avoiding making unpopular choices. However, the most significant reasons for delegating powers – and the ones to be considered here – are two: first, to reduce decision making costs, for instance by taking advantage of executive-branch expertise; and…