This book had its beginnings several years ago as a dissertation in the philosophy department of the University of Chicago. I was and am still interested in the origins of moral judgment, particularly in the commonplace phenomenon of shared standards of moral judgment in human communities. Where did these standards come from? Why did they arise? How are they justified? I first became interested in these questions by reading Hume's second Enquiry, which, it seemed to me, contained hints of an evolutionary explanation—but only the hints. When I discovered that Smith was a close friend of Hume's and that Hume read and admired Smith's work, I decided to read The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) to see whether there was anything of value in it. I could not believe my eyes: here was a good—indeed, great—work in moral philosophy, and yet so few moral philosophers read it, let alone studied it.

I decided to study it. TMS became the centerpiece of my dissertation, then of several journal articles, and now of this, my first book. I attempt here to give a comprehensive, faithful interpretation of TMS and to relate what I see as its central methodological program to other central parts of Smith's work. Some elements of this book were present in my dissertation, but the majority of it is new, and in any case I have changed my mind about many things since I wrote the dissertation.