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Introduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 December 2009

Maarten Janssen
Affiliation:
Professor of Microeconomics, Erasmus University, Rotterdam
Maarten Janssen
Affiliation:
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
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Summary

Governments own many assets that are of genuine importance to society and that, for one reason or another, they do not want to exploit on their own. Examples include: mobile telephony frequencies, radio frequencies, airport slots, public infrastructure, land for different uses, high-voltage electricity cables, etc. In all these cases, a government needs to choose one or more private companies to use these assets in a proper way: it needs to select mobile telephony companies, (commercial) radio stations, airlines, rail (or other transport) operators, oil companies (if the land is designated for use as a petrol station). What all these cases have in common, besides the fact that the government has to choose who can use the public assets, is that the assets to be allocated are used to serve consumers in a market type of environment.

There are potentially many ways a government can allocate these assets. It can use auctions, Beauty Contests, first-come-first-served, grandfather rights and lotteries, to mention just a few of the most common allocation mechanisms. In auctions, firms typically have to make one or more financial bid(s) and the company with the highest bid wins the object to be allocated. In a Beauty Contest, firms have to submit a plan of how they will use the asset in the future and they have to provide credentials that make their plan trustworthy. A committee typically determines who wins the contest.

Type
Chapter
Information
Auctioning Public Assets
Analysis and Alternatives
, pp. 1 - 16
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

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References

Binmore, K. and Klemperer, P. 2002, ‘The biggest auction ever’, Economic Journal 112: 74–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Janssen, M., A. Ros and N. van der Windt 2001, ‘De draad kwijt? Onderzoek naar de gang van zaken rond de Nederlandse UMTS-ve iling’ (Research into the proceedings of the Dutch UMTS auction), Erasmus University Rotterdam
Manelli, A. and Vincent, D. 1995, ‘Optimal procurement mechanisms’, Econometrica 63: 591–620CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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  • Introduction
    • By Maarten Janssen, Professor of Microeconomics, Erasmus University, Rotterdam
  • Edited by Maarten Janssen, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
  • Book: Auctioning Public Assets
  • Online publication: 03 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610844.002
Available formats
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  • Introduction
    • By Maarten Janssen, Professor of Microeconomics, Erasmus University, Rotterdam
  • Edited by Maarten Janssen, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
  • Book: Auctioning Public Assets
  • Online publication: 03 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610844.002
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Introduction
    • By Maarten Janssen, Professor of Microeconomics, Erasmus University, Rotterdam
  • Edited by Maarten Janssen, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
  • Book: Auctioning Public Assets
  • Online publication: 03 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610844.002
Available formats
×