We saw in Chapter 2 that the two most important implications of Hobbes's principle of political obligation were that sovereignty must not be divided and that it must not be limited. We saw in Chapter 3 that Hobbes was particularly concerned about one special form of division or limitation: the division of the rights of sovereignty between civil and religious authorities, and the limitation of civil authority by religious authority (either individual, as in the case of private conscience and private interpretation of Scripture, or collective, as in the case of authority exercised by churches conceived as independent of the state). Indeed, as I shall argue, Hobbes took the primary source of social disorder to be divisions of or limitations on civil authority of precisely this sort. It was crucial for Hobbes to persuade his readers that civil sovereignty included supreme religious authority, for “if that were not, but kings should command one thing upon pain of death, and priests another upon pain of damnation, it would be impossible that peace and religion should stand together” (EL 2.7.10, emphasis added).