Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Part I Introduction
- Part II Contracts, organizations, and institutions
- Part III Law and economics
- Part IV Theoretical developments: where do we stand?
- Part V Testing contract theories
- Part VI Applied issues: contributions to industrial organization
- 18 Residual claims and self-enforcement as incentive mechanisms in franchise contracts: substitutes or complements?
- 19 The quasi-judicial role of large retailers: an efficiency hypothesis of their relation with suppliers
- 20 Interconnection agreements in telecommunications networks: from strategic behaviors to property rights
- 21 Licensing in the chemical industry
- Part VII Policy issues: anti-trust and regulation of public utilities
- Bibliography
- Index of names
- Subject index
20 - Interconnection agreements in telecommunications networks: from strategic behaviors to property rights
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 January 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Part I Introduction
- Part II Contracts, organizations, and institutions
- Part III Law and economics
- Part IV Theoretical developments: where do we stand?
- Part V Testing contract theories
- Part VI Applied issues: contributions to industrial organization
- 18 Residual claims and self-enforcement as incentive mechanisms in franchise contracts: substitutes or complements?
- 19 The quasi-judicial role of large retailers: an efficiency hypothesis of their relation with suppliers
- 20 Interconnection agreements in telecommunications networks: from strategic behaviors to property rights
- 21 Licensing in the chemical industry
- Part VII Policy issues: anti-trust and regulation of public utilities
- Bibliography
- Index of names
- Subject index
Summary
Introduction
Interconnection regulation is a major issue for the liberalization of energy and telecommunications networks. Certainly, it is a focal point for tensions and interest conflicts among operators. In France, for example, the Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (ART) has to settle disputes concerning interconnection. These conflicts, opposing most often the incumbent operator France Telecom to its new competitors, deal with the unbundling of the local loop or the termination charges of calls from fixed to mobile networks.
Generally, interconnection has a precise objective: the subscribers of the interconnected networks are given the opportunity to have access to more subscribers (telecommunications) or more suppliers (energy or water). Interconnection requires a technical harmonization, as well as a contractual, often bilateral, arrangement among network operators. More precisely, in an interconnection contract operators define the conditions of access to their networks and the corresponding usage rights. In this chapter we will consider mainly telecommunications networks (voice and data). But many economic issues raised are equally relevant, mutatis mutandis, for other interconnected networks.
In telephone networks, interconnection agreements have been strongly influenced by the institutional framework in which they have emerged. For a long time, the telephone services relied on the principle of “network integrity.” This notion appeared in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century, under the influence of T. Vail, the AT&T's CEO of that time, to justify the monopoly given to his private company. As long as only national monopolies provided voice services, interconnection was merely a problem of international, diplomatic bargaining. For data networks, the relationships concerning the right of usage have been strongly influenced by the academic origin of the Internet.
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- The Economics of ContractsTheories and Applications, pp. 358 - 372Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2002
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