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Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Figures
- Acknowledgments
- A Unified Theory of Party Competition
- 1 Modeling Party Competition
- 2 How Voters Decide: The Components of the Unified Theory of Voting
- 3 Linking Voter Choice to Party Strategies: Illustrating the Role of Nonpolicy Factors
- 4 Factors Influencing the Link between Party Strategy and the Variables Affecting Voter Choice: Theoretical Results
- 5 Policy Competition under the Unified Theory: Empirical Applications to the 1988 French Presidential Election
- 6 Policy Competition under the Unified Theory: Empirical Applications to the 1989 Norwegian Parliamentary Election
- 7 The Threat of Abstention: Candidate Strategies and Policy Representation in U.S. Presidential Elections
- 8 Candidate Strategies with Voter Abstention in U.S. Presidential Elections: 1980, 1984, 1988, 1996, and 2000
- 9 Policy Competition in Britain: The 1997 General Election
- 10 The Consequences of Voter Projection: Assimilation and Contrast Effects
- 11 Policy-Seeking Motivations of Parties in Two-Party Elections: Theory
- 12 Policy-Seeking Motivations of Parties in Two-Party Elections: Empirical Analysis
- 13 Concluding Remarks
- Appendix 1.1 Literature Review: Work Linking Behavioral Research to Spatial Modeling
- Appendix 2.1 Alternative Statistical Models of Voter Choice
- Appendix 2.2 Controversies in Voting Research: The Electoral Impact of Party Identification
- Appendix 2.3 Relationship between the Unified Discounting Model and the Directional Model of Rabinowitz and Macdonald
- Appendix 3.1 Spatial Models That Incorporate Valence Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation
- Appendix 4.1 Uniqueness Theorem and Algorithm for Computing Nash Equilibria
- Appendix 4.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
- Appendix 4.3 Simulation Analysis and an Approximation Formula for Nash Equilibria
- Appendix 4.4 Derivations of Formulas Relating Electoral Factors to the Shrinkage Factor, ck
- Appendix 6.1 Equilibria for Outcome-Oriented Motivations: The Kedar Model
- Appendix 7.1 Proof of Lemma 7.1
- Appendix 7.2 Derivations for the Unified Turnout Model
- Appendix 8.1 Coding and Model Specifications
- Appendix 8.2 Alternative Turnout Models
- Appendix 11.1 Proof of Theorem 11.1
- Appendix 11.2 Empirical Estimation of the Mean and Standard Deviation of Valence Effects
- References
- Index
10 - The Consequences of Voter Projection: Assimilation and Contrast Effects
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Figures
- Acknowledgments
- A Unified Theory of Party Competition
- 1 Modeling Party Competition
- 2 How Voters Decide: The Components of the Unified Theory of Voting
- 3 Linking Voter Choice to Party Strategies: Illustrating the Role of Nonpolicy Factors
- 4 Factors Influencing the Link between Party Strategy and the Variables Affecting Voter Choice: Theoretical Results
- 5 Policy Competition under the Unified Theory: Empirical Applications to the 1988 French Presidential Election
- 6 Policy Competition under the Unified Theory: Empirical Applications to the 1989 Norwegian Parliamentary Election
- 7 The Threat of Abstention: Candidate Strategies and Policy Representation in U.S. Presidential Elections
- 8 Candidate Strategies with Voter Abstention in U.S. Presidential Elections: 1980, 1984, 1988, 1996, and 2000
- 9 Policy Competition in Britain: The 1997 General Election
- 10 The Consequences of Voter Projection: Assimilation and Contrast Effects
- 11 Policy-Seeking Motivations of Parties in Two-Party Elections: Theory
- 12 Policy-Seeking Motivations of Parties in Two-Party Elections: Empirical Analysis
- 13 Concluding Remarks
- Appendix 1.1 Literature Review: Work Linking Behavioral Research to Spatial Modeling
- Appendix 2.1 Alternative Statistical Models of Voter Choice
- Appendix 2.2 Controversies in Voting Research: The Electoral Impact of Party Identification
- Appendix 2.3 Relationship between the Unified Discounting Model and the Directional Model of Rabinowitz and Macdonald
- Appendix 3.1 Spatial Models That Incorporate Valence Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation
- Appendix 4.1 Uniqueness Theorem and Algorithm for Computing Nash Equilibria
- Appendix 4.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
- Appendix 4.3 Simulation Analysis and an Approximation Formula for Nash Equilibria
- Appendix 4.4 Derivations of Formulas Relating Electoral Factors to the Shrinkage Factor, ck
- Appendix 6.1 Equilibria for Outcome-Oriented Motivations: The Kedar Model
- Appendix 7.1 Proof of Lemma 7.1
- Appendix 7.2 Derivations for the Unified Turnout Model
- Appendix 8.1 Coding and Model Specifications
- Appendix 8.2 Alternative Turnout Models
- Appendix 11.1 Proof of Theorem 11.1
- Appendix 11.2 Empirical Estimation of the Mean and Standard Deviation of Valence Effects
- References
- Index
Summary
Introduction
In the standard Downsian model, voters are assumed to choose parties based on the extent of ideological proximity between the voter's own position and that of the party. Yet voters may misestimate the policy platforms of candidates or parties, either out of ignorance or in a fashion that reflects systematic bias. For example, some voters may subjectively position parties that they favor closer to the voter's own preferred policy location than do voters as a whole.
Insights taken from the psychological literature on persuasion (Sherif and Hovland 1961; Parducci and Marshall 1962) distinguish between two different types of bias/projection effects: assimilation and contrast. Assimilation effects refer to shortening the perceived ideological distance between oneself and parties (or candidates) whom one favors; contrast effects refer to exaggerating the distance between oneself and parties (or candidates) whom one does not support.
The importance of assimilation and contrast to our study of optimal party locations and equilibrium configurations is that perceptions of where the parties are located can alter the effects of party positioning on voters' decision calculus. If, for example, Republican voters in the United States perceive the Democratic candidate to be significantly more liberal than do other voters (and we present evidence that this is the case), they will be even less likely to vote for the Democrat (and less likely to abstain due to indifference) than might be predicted by our models, which use mean placement by all voters to specify party position.
Therefore, assimilation and contrast have the effect of intensifying the centrifugal effect of party ID on party strategies.
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- Information
- A Unified Theory of Party CompetitionA Cross-National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Factors, pp. 170 - 183Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005