My analysis, like all others, leaves several questions unanswered. Although we have uncovered much about the causes of the ebbs and flows of racial policy preferences, we have not begun to explore the consequences of these shifts. To turn our key dependent variable into an independent variable, we can ask: Do these shifts in public opinion on race have policy consequences? Do they have electoral consequences, affecting the fortunes of candidates for public office? If they affect policy, how do they do it? Do they affect various types of racial policy, like antidiscrimination enforcement or affirmative action, or (and?) do they affect broader policies like welfare and the government's redistributive posture?

The answer to some of the above questions, presumably, is yes, though there is no evidence for it in this book. Perhaps I say “presumably” out of a sense of hope or optimism that our policy-making system is at least partly a function of inputs from public opinion. Or perhaps I say it out of fear that, if opinion has no effects, we have studied the causes of something that is itself impotent. Probably both.

The questions I have raised here strike me as important.