The analyses presented in the previous two chapters have shown that legislators' uptake behavior conforms to our expectations of uptake as a reelection-oriented activity. In short, legislators behave as though they believe that engaging in it helps them to secure reelection. Vulnerability is related to overall levels of uptake in the manner predicted by the strategic motivation theory, and legislators appear to be conscious of reelection considerations in deciding when and how to demonstrate their responsiveness. These findings provide support for the central proposition of the theory of uptake developed here – that legislators are motivated to take up their challengers' campaign issues because this behavior can pay off for them in the next election. To address this critical issue more directly, this chapter investigates in detail the dynamics of the linkages between legislators' uptake behavior and their future electoral fortunes.

It is a common conclusion of research on legislative behavior that representatives and senators believe that their activities in office impact their electoral prospects (see, for example, Fenno 1978; Kingdon 1989; Mayhew 1974). Consequently, the view of legislators as reelection-driven (or at least reelection-oriented) has become the organizing concept of the literature on congressional roll call voting, constituency service, and committee participation. Furthermore, we generally assume that legislators' beliefs about the importance of their actions are not unfounded and that reelection-oriented behavior does in fact yield a payoff in future elections.