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8 - The Self

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 January 2010

Richard M. Gale
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh
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Summary

James's promethean pragmatic self, being a restless, indefatigable desire–satisfaction maximizer, was seen in Part I to be always on the make in his quest to have it all. Toward this end he had to adopt an externalized stance toward worldly objects, since his concern was with successfully manipulating them for his own purposes. His pragmatic theory of meaning and truth supplied him with recipes for successfully riding herd on them. In addition they served as a univocal methodological reconciler or mediator between the projects and interests of his many different selves, but only a partial reconciler since conflicts still remained between the perspectives of these selves, especially those of the moral agent and scientist with regard to the issue of determinism, free will, and bifurcationism. The stronger medicine of a Poo-bahistic ontological relativism was needed, requiring him never to go anywhere or do anything without being armed with a “qua”-clause. Even the doctrine of Pure Experience, which turned out to be a failed though noble experiment, had a reconciling intent within the world of sensible objects. The will-to-believe doctrine served his promethean self by permitting him to believe in epistemically undecidable matters, such as that God and free will exist, in a manner that would enable him to be an active agent in bringing about the flourishing of his many selves. It doesn't get any more promethean than this.

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Chapter
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The Philosophy of William James
An Introduction
, pp. 159 - 177
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

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  • The Self
  • Richard M. Gale, University of Pittsburgh
  • Book: The Philosophy of William James
  • Online publication: 06 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511617300.010
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  • The Self
  • Richard M. Gale, University of Pittsburgh
  • Book: The Philosophy of William James
  • Online publication: 06 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511617300.010
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • The Self
  • Richard M. Gale, University of Pittsburgh
  • Book: The Philosophy of William James
  • Online publication: 06 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511617300.010
Available formats
×