2 - HOW AND WHY TRUST NETWORKS WORK
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 December 2009
Summary
The vividly contrasting experiences of fourteenth-century Waldensians, sixteenth-century English mercantile families, and twentieth-century conscripts suffice to establish change and variation in relations among rulers, public politics, and trust networks. They range from energetic segregation of trust networks against intervention of ecclesiastical and political authorities (Waldensians) to contingent, consequential integration of those networks into public politics (conscription). Let us think more generally about what sorts of change and variation we have to explain. Figure 2.1 schematizes the general analytical problem: what sort of variation in connections between public politics and trust networks must we account for? The vertical axis distinguishes roughly among a) segregation of trust networks from public politics, b) negotiated connections between the two, and c) integration of trust networks directly into systems of rule. The horizontal axis distinguishes among three means of connection between rulers and ruled: coercion, capital, and commitment.
Coercion includes all concerted means of action that commonly cause loss or damage to the persons, possessions, or sustaining social relations of social actors. It features means such as weapons, armed forces, prisons, damaging information, and organized routines for imposing sanctions. Coercion's organization helps define the nature of regimes. With low accumulations of coercion, all regimes are insubstantial, while with high levels of coercive accumulation and concentration all regimes are formidable.
Capital refers to tangible, transferable resources that in combination with effort can produce increases in use value, plus enforceable claims on such resources.
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- Trust and Rule , pp. 30 - 51Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005
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